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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 18/05/2006 Accident number: 282 
Accident time: not recorded Accident Date: 06/01/1992 
Where it occurred: not made available Country: Kuwait 
Primary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Other Date of main report: [No date recorded] 
ID original source: KMOD 43/SER 30 Name of source: Various/AVS 2001:K6 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: Ordnance Ground condition: demolition site 
(explosives) 
Date record created: 19/02/2004 Date  last modified: 19/02/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: not recorded Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
no independent investigation available (?) 
inadequate investigation (?) 
inadequate training (?) 
safety distances ignored (?) 
 
Accident report 
The details of Kuwait Boards of Inquiry are considered ‘Commercial in Confidence”. The 
following summary is gathered from various documentary and anecdotal evidence made 
available during the research. All anecdotal evidence is drawn from sources who were in 
Kuwait at the time of the accident. 
Information came from staff of a British demining company that had BAC teams unloading 
serviceable ammunition at a designated Kuwait Ministry of Defence ammunition Depot. The 
1 
group were making field storage stacks in accordance with the principles of UK Ammunition 
storage regulations. Unfortunately, all organisations, including National Army teams from 
Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Egypt, were also unloading at the same depot. There was no 
overall control of this and each organisation “did its own thing”. The entire dump contained an 
estimated 15000 tons of ammunition. 
The British company’s storage area was designed to minimise the propagation of a fire should 
an event occur. However, other organisations saw the large gaps in the ammo stacks and 
filled them, in some cases with loose propellant and BM21 rockets (facing in every direction).  
Despite protests by the demining company to KMOD, nothing was done to stop or correct the 
dangerous situation.  
A small fire started in an unknown area (rumour had it that a pipe-smoker knocking out his 
pipe started the fire) and rapidly spread to the field storage sites where its spread was 
accelerated by BM21 rockets and other projectiles “going ballistic”. Six local trucks hired to 
the British demining company, were destroyed. 
The demining company staff present retreated to within an Explosive Storage Site (protective 
walls etc). They withdrew from the site when it was safe to do so and were evacuated without 
injury. Many Thai TCNs (Third Country Nationals) were missing for the night but were found 
safe in the morning. They had dug themselves into the sand for self preservation and survived 
unscathed.  
One casualty was a subcontractor of the British commercial company. This was a Palestinian 
who was an “owner/driver” and went back to try to get his truck out. The ex-pats trying to 
organise an orderly withdrawal saw him and his truck “vaporised”. Two KMOD soldiers and 
another individual were also reported to have been killed. (Only the driver is recorded in this 
database because he was an indirect employee of the British demining company: the status 
of the others is unknown.)  
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 358 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: driver  Fit for work: DECEASED 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: not recorded 
Protection issued: None Protection used: none 
 
Summary of injuries: 
FATAL 
COMMENT 
Victim was seen "vaporised".  
No medical report was made available. 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a “Management/control inadequacy” because 
the dangers at the site were known and no action was taken to make the area safe. 
There is a paucity of reliable data for many of the accidents that occurred in Kuwait. If any 
reader has additional detail, please send it for inclusion.  
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